How Bush Gets His Way with the Wise Old Men

One of the more amazing passages from Woodward’s book Bush At War gives great insight into not only the workings of W’s mind, decision methods and leadership skills... but also helps explain how such strong, experienced men as Powell, and O’Neill went along with and helped implement the many failed strategies in Iraq.... Of course neither Cheney, Rumsfeld or Condoleezza Rice could be expected to second guess or question the strategies and plans they had prepared and in many cases championed. Note: while parts of this long passage appearing on pages 254-263 have been summarized, direct quotes from the book are in quotation marks, underlining is added for emphasis, and our comments are in brackets and red.

    Access to see the president after his normal working day was over at 6:30 p.m. was a special privilege granted only to Cheney, Rice, Card, Hughes, Rove and Fleischer. Bush believed “that part of the job satisfaction of being a White House staffer is the capacity to talk to the president one-on-one,” and that it worked the other way around too: “It makes my job a heck of a lot easier to be able to have access to a lot of people.” [Few if any modern presidents have had working days that end at 6:30 p.m. And these five are a lot of people?] Rice asked Bush’s personal secretary, Ashley Estes if she could see the president for 5 minutes or so on the evening of October 25th.
     “Bush’s leadership style bordered on the hurried. He wanted action, solutions. Once on a course, he directed his energy at forging on, rarely looking back, scoffing – even ridiculing – doubt and anything less than 100 percent commitment. He seemed to harbor few, if any, regrets. His short declarations could seem impulsive. [Hurried, rarely looking back, scoffing -- even ridiculing doubt, short declarations rather than reasoned discourses, impulsive!] “I know it is hard for you to believe, but I have not doubted what we’re doing,” Bush said in a later interview. “I have not doubted.... There is no doubt in my mind we’re doing the right thing. Not one doubt.” [The “right thing” isn't always the smart thing... and simply put, a total lack of doubt in such important matters is neither rational or normal.]
     Rice knew this characteristic. Yet doubt could be the handmaiden of sound policy, she thought. [Duh!] Careful reconsideration is a necessary part of any decision-making process. [Duh!] Rice felt it was her job to raise caution flags, even red lights if necessary, to urge the president to rethink. Sometimes the best decision is to overrule an earlier one.” [Duh!]
     Bush had finished his daily physical fitness routine and was still in his exercise clothes. “He was not dripping sweat, but had cooled down – perhaps the right time for such a conversation, if there ever was.” [So even his very closest advisors had to pick the right time – when the exercise endorphins were still surging – to tell Bush that some of the principles were questioning the plan?] Rice noted that nothing was moving in the war and the mood among the principles wasn't very good and there was some hand wringing. “The president jerked forward. Hand wringing? He hated, absolutely hated the very idea, especially in tough times. He was getting some reports from Hughes and Rove about media stories, but not much more.” [Some reports? And Hughes and Rove tell him what the media is saying?]
   When the president asked Rice if she thought the plan was working, she did not really answer, in part because she didn't want to close off any options, but also because she was “unsure” of what the president was thinking “so she was sounding him out. [Rice was afraid she would close off options if she raised them? And if she was unsure what the president was thinking, who was?] But the president was on his chosen course and he had not really thought of shifting strategies.” [Hadn't thought about developing alternative strategies or hadn't thought about shifting to them?] Rice told him that at the next days NCS meeting “it would be good if you expressed confidence in this plan. Or if you don't feel that, then we need to do something else.” [Was Rice unsure what Bush was thinking... or did she want him to think about alternatives?]
   “I’ll take care of it,” the president said.
   For Bush it was a memorable discussion. Rice's job was to tell him things. Sometimes he liked to hear them, sometimes he didn't....” [Rice's telling him that some had doubts was a memorable discussion?]
   At the end of the next morning's NCS meeting Bush said “I just want to make sure that all of us did agree on this plan, right?” He looked around the table from face to face.
   There is an aspect of baseball coach, even fraternity brother urgency in Bush at such moments. He leans his head forward and holds it still, makes eye contact, maintains it, saying in effect, You're on board, you're with me right?
   Are we right? The president was asking. Are we still confident? He wanted a precise affirmation from each one – Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld, Tenet and Rice – even backbenchers Hadley and Scooter Libby. He was almost demanding they take an oath.
   Each affirmed allegiance to the plan and strategy.
   “Anybody have any ideas they want to put on the table?”
   No’s all around.
   Rice believed the president would tolerate debate, would listen, but anyone who wanted debate had to have a good argument, and preferably a solution or at least a proposed fix. [Rice “believed” Bush would tolerate debate... but wasn't sure... and “believed” he would listen... but wasn't sure... which all is very different from encouraging and participating in a debate!] It was clear that no one at the table had a better idea. [Or that no one at the table was willing to raise other ideas?]
   In fact the president had not really opened the door a crack for anyone to raise concerns or deal with any second thoughts. He was not really listening. He wanted to talk. He knew that he talked too much at times, just blowing off steam. It was not a good habit, he knew.” [Aha! In fact Bush didn't open the door even a crack for anyone to raise concerns or second thoughts because he instinctively knew he was right. But he also knew that going around the room to demand fealty was just blowing off steam, and a bad habit.]
     ‘You know what? We need to be patient,’ Bush said. We've got a good plan.’
     ‘Look, we’re entering a difficult phase. The press will seek to find divisions among us. They will try to force on us a strategy that is not consistent with victory.’ In the secrecy of the room, the president had voiced one of his conclusions -- the news media, or at least some elements, did not want victory, or at least acted as if they did not.” [So if Bush concluded that reporters who voiced misgivings about a plan didn't want victory, what would he conclude about any of those in the room who did so? No wonder Rice was so careful how she approached Bush on such touchy topics.]
   This passage goes on to say that Bush believed his role was to provide the backbone, and that while he didn't listen to the misgivings in the press, he knew the principles did. Thus his message was to not “let the press panic us. The press would say that the current strategy was a failed strategy. He disagreed. ‘Resist the second-guessing. Be confident but patient.... it's all going to work.... '
     Hadley thought that tension suddenly drained from the room.... In their souls Hadley believed some of them had to wonder if the president might be losing confidence in them. Presidential confidence, once bestowed, was vital for them to function. Any hint of less than full trust would be devastating. [Devastating to them personally or to the country?] They served at his pleasure. They could be gone or sidelined in an instant. [Another truth: the most important thing is not to be sidelined or gone from their prestigious job.] Not only had Bush declared confidence in their strategy, but more importantly, Hadley believed, he had declared confidence in them....
     Rice believed it was one of the most important moments. If the president had opened up to alternatives, the war cabinet would have lost the focus of trying to make the current strategy work and flitted off to think of alternatives.”
    (Another way to highlight what is really happening in this passage is to re-write it as we'd wish it read... click here for a Re-Write of this critical passage... and compare it side-by-side to the original!)

   Focusing on trying to make a strategy work is of course admirable... as long the strategy is working... AND in this case it did since these discussions involved the first war in Afghanistan against the Taliban... but if voicing misgivings that a current plan was in fact working is tantamount to "not wanting victory," who would tell this president if it wasn't working... especially in the second war against Saddam in Iraq?
     "Group think," which holds that instead of providing the best answers, the pressure in a group to be a team player overwhelms good decision skills, was likely involved to some degree. (A prime example of "group think" is Enron which had more blue-chip outside directors on its board than almost all other peer group companies, but all likewise failed to stop a disaster.) But obviously something more than "group think" is going on in this passage, i.e. Bush is using his "emotional intelligence" to manipulate people to his way... focusing on sticking to a plan rather than encouraging opposing views or welcoming conflicting facts, and then demanding fealty in a situation that left no option even if the participants were not sure..... In another passage Bush asks if there is anything else he should know, and if the commanders have everything they need. But again, these are very last minute, pro forma, CYA questions... and asked after Bush and Rumsfeld kept insisting on plans that used far few troops than the military desired.
     Perhaps the most telling thing about this passage is that the Bush White House believes it shows the president in his best light... AND in this case a big picture, impatient president who refuses to get involved in details, and who does not welcome different views or facts... and who once he makes a decision, based on instinct and faith, sticks with it was successful... and likely more so than a more conventional and cautious approach... BUT in the Iraq war that followed these same traits and strengths quickly became enormous weaknesses and liabilities...